Communication, Distortion, and Randomness in Metric Voting by Kempe, David
ar
X
iv
:1
91
1.
08
12
9v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  2
0 N
ov
 20
19
Communication, Distortion, and Randomness in Metric Voting
David Kempe
University of Southern California
Abstract
In distortion-based analysis of social choice rules over metric spaces, one assumes that all
voters and candidates are jointly embedded in a common metric space. Voters rank candidates
by non-decreasing distance. The mechanism, receiving only this ordinal (comparison) informa-
tion, aims to nonetheless select a candidate approximately minimizing the sum of distances from
all voters to the chosen candidate. It is known that while the Copeland rule and related rules
guarantee distortion at most 5, many other standard voting rules, such as Plurality, Veto, or
k-approval, have distortion growing unboundedly in the number n of candidates.
An advantage of Plurality, Veto, or k-approval with small k is that they require less communi-
cation from the voters; all deterministic social choice rules known to achieve constant distortion
require voters to transmit their complete ranking of all candidates. This motivates our study
of the tradeoff between the distortion and the amount of communication in deterministic social
choice rules.
We show that any one-round deterministic voting mechanism in which each voter commu-
nicates only the candidates she ranks in a given set of k positions must have distortion at least
2n−k
k
; we give a mechanism achieving an upper bound of O(n/k), which matches the lower bound
up to a constant. For more general communication-bounded voting mechanisms, in which each
voter communicates b bits of information about her ranking, we show a slightly weaker lower
bound of Ω(n/b) on the distortion.
For randomized mechanisms, the situation looks much brighter: it is known that Random
Dictatorship achieves expected distortion strictly smaller than 3, almost matching a lower bound
of 3− 2
n
for any randomized mechanism that only receives each voter’s top choice. We close this
gap, by giving a simple randomized social choice rule which only uses each voter’s first choice,
and achieves expected distortion 3− 2
n
.
1 Introduction
In voting or social choice, there is a set of n alternatives (such as political candidates or courses
of action) from which a group (such as a country or an organization) wants to select a winner.1
Each voter submits a ranking (or preference order) of the candidates, and the mechanism (or social
choice rule) chooses a winner based on these submitted rankings.
Many different social choice rules have been proposed, and it is an important question how to
compare them. One fruitful and long line of work, dating back at least to the correspondence of
Borda and Condorcet [25, 26], formulates axioms that a social choice rule “should” satisfy; one
can then compare social choice rules by which or how many of these axioms they satisfy [19].
Unfortunately, many results in this area are impossibility results, most notably Arrow’s result
1A large and important part of the literature studies the goal of choosing a complete consensus ranking of all
candidates; we will not study this alternative goal here, and therefore identify social choice with the selection of a
single winner.
1
for producing a consensus ranking [7] and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem ruling out truthful
voting rules with minimal additional properties [34, 49].
An alternative to the axiomatic approach is to consider social choice as an optimization problem
with the goal of selecting the “best” candidate for the population [17, 20, 47, 48]. A natural
way to express the notion of “best” is to assume that each voter has a utility (or cost) for each
candidate; the mechanism’s goal is to optimize the aggregate (e.g., average or median) utility or cost
of all voters. However, as articulated in [18, 4], the social choice rule has to optimize with crucial
information missing: a voter can only communicate her2 ranking according to the utility/cost. In
other words, the mechanism receives only ordinal information — which candidate is preferred over
which other candidate — even though it needs to optimize a cardinal objective function. From
an optimization perspective, this means that the mechanism should simultaneously optimize over
all utility/cost functions that are consistent with the reported rankings, in that they would give
rise to the observed rankings. The worst-case ratio (over all cost/utility functions) between the
mechanism’s cost/utility and that of the optimum candidate for the specific function is called the
mechanism’s distortion. (Formal definitions of all concepts and terms are given in Section 2.)
In applying this general framework, an important question is what class of cost/utility functions
to consider. A natural approach was suggested in [4] (see also the expanded/improved journal
version [3] and general overview [2]): all candidates and voters are jointly embedded in a metric
space, and the cost of voter v for candidate x is their metric distance d(v, x). The assumption
that voters rank candidates by non-decreasing distance in a latent space dates back to earlier work
on so-called single-peaked preferences [13, 14, 29, 43, 41, 10, 9], though much of the earlier work
focuses on the special case when the metric is the line. Using the framework of distortion and
metric costs, [4, 3] show a remarkable separation. While many commonly used voting rules (such
as Plurality, Veto, k-approval, Borda count) have either unbounded distortion or distortion linear
in the number n of candidates, and indeed all score-based rules have distortion ω(1) (in terms of
the number of candidates), uncovered-set rules have distortion at most 5. To describe uncovered-
set rules, consider a tournament graph G on the n candidates which contains the directed edge
(x, y) iff at least as many voters prefer x to y as vice versa. The uncovered set of G is the set of
all candidates with paths of length at most 2 to all other candidates [44]; an example of such a
candidates is the candidate x with maximum outdegree, which is selected by the Copeland rule. [3]
show that any candidate in the uncovered set of G has distortion at most 5, and also show a lower
bound of 3 on the distortion of every deterministic voting mechanism.
One advantage of some of the mechanisms with large distortion — such as Plurality, Veto, or
k-approval with small k — is that they require little communication from the voters. Instead of
having to transmit her entire ranking, a voter under Plurality only needs to share her first choice;
similarly a voter under Veto only needs to share her last choice. This observation raises the question
of whether high distortion is inherently a consequence of limited communication between voters
and the mechanism.
The answer to the preceding question is clearly “No:” there are simple randomized mechanisms
achieving constant distortion. Perhaps the simplest is Random Dictatorship: “Return the first
choice of a uniformly random voter.” This mechanism is known to have distortion strictly smaller
than 3 [5], a smaller distortion than any deterministic mechanism can achieve. However, despite
the frequent mathematical appeal and elegance of randomized algorithms and mechanisms, most
organizations are leery of using randomization for making important decisions;3 hence, we consider
2For consistency and clarity, we will always refer to voters using female and candidates using male pronouns.
3A reader taking issue with this statement may want to think about his/her own computer science, mathematics,
economics, or operations research department. Even though these are likely among the most savvy organizations in
terms of understanding randomization, decision making procedures practically never involve randomization, except
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determinism a very desirable property in the design of voting mechanisms. Considering the following
three properties: (1) low distortion, (2) low communication, (3) determinism, it is known that any
two can be achieved simultaneously:
• Random Dictatorship satisfies (1), (2).
• Uncovered-set mechanisms satisfy (1), (3).
• Plurality and many other mechanisms satisfy (2), (3).
The big-picture question we investigate in this article is the tradeoff between all three of these
desirable properties.
1.1 Our Models and Results
We only consider the goal of minimizing the average (or total) metric distance of all voters from the
winning candidate.4 Our main result, proved in Section 4, is essentially a negative answer to the
question of whether any voting mechanisms can simultaneously have all three desirable properties.
We consider a model in which each voter communicates b bits of information about her ranking to
the mechanism, in a single round.5 Associated with each b-bit string µ is a subset Πµ of rankings.
The Πµ must form a disjoint cover of all possible rankings. If they did not form a cover, some
voters might not have any message to send, making the mechanism ill-defined. And if the Πµ were
not disjoint, then it is not clear how a voter with multiple possible messages µ would make the
(non-deterministic) choice which one to send; in particular, this choice could depend on the actual
metric distances, and it might require much more subtle definitions to place meaningful restrictions
on a mechanism to not exploit such information. Each voter communicates the (unique) µ such
that her permutation is in Πµ. We require that the same set Πµ is associated with the string µ,
regardless of the identity of the voter sending the string.6 Under this model, in Section 4, we prove
the following lower bound:
Theorem 1.1 Every one-round deterministic voting mechanism in which each voter sends only a
b-bit string to the mechanism has distortion at least 2n−4b − 1.
Most mechanisms with limited communication are of a fairly specific form: voters can commu-
nicate only their choices in a (small) set K of k positions of their ranking, typically at the top or
bottom of their ballots. (Either giving the candidate for each such position, or specifying them as a
set, as in k-approval.) For such restricted mechanisms, a simpler proof (in Section 3) gives a lower
bound that is stronger by a factor Θ(log n):
Theorem 1.2 Any deterministic one-round social choice rule which receives, from each voter, no
information about candidates outside positions K in her ranking, has distortion at least 2n−|K||K| .
the occasional coin flip to break a tie. (And no, the fact that most of your colleagues seem to vote essentially randomly
does not count!)
The reasons for such a preference in most organization likely include an aversion to variance or low-probability
undesirable events; naturally, one can envision guarantees between deterministic and expectation bounds, such as the
bounds on the squared distortion in [31].
4Recall that [4] and several follow-up articles studied both the average and median distance.
5Analyzing the distortion of multi-round deterministic mechanisms with limited communication is a very interest-
ing direction for future work.
6Our results require this assumption. While studying the power of mechanisms that allow different voters to
use different encodings of their preferences would be interesting theoretically, voting mechanisms which treat votes
differently a priori tend to not be accepted in practice.
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The proof of Theorem 1.2 is significantly easier and cleaner than the proof of Theorem 1.1,
while still containing some of the key ideas. Therefore, we present the proof of Theorem 1.2 before
that of Theorem 1.1.
Theorem 1.2 provides a generalization of Theorem 1 of the recent work [31], which proves linear
distortion for the special case when K consists of the top k positions, for constant k. In fact,
[31] shows these lower bounds on the expected squared distortion of randomized mechanisms; this
directly implies the same bounds for deterministic mechanisms.
The fact that the lower bound of Theorem 1.2 is stronger than that of Theorem 1.1 by a factor
of Θ(log n) is discussed in more detail in Section 4. To see it most immediately, consider the case
|K| = k = ω(n/ log n), k = o(n). Because k = o(n), Theorem 1.2 provides a super-constant lower
bound on the distortion. On the other hand, communicating the positions of k candidates requires
b = ω(n) bits, so the lower bound of Theorem 1.1 is vacuous. Closing this Θ(log n) gap is an
interesting direction for future work, discussed in Section 7.
The reason we consider Theorem 1.1 our main contribution is that it helps us pinpoint the
source of high distortion. Several recent works have shown lower bounds on the distortion of dif-
ferent specific classes of social choice rules, such as score-based rules [3] or the above-mentioned
top-k ballots [31]. Our result implies that regardless of the intricacy of the mechanism, low com-
munication (within the context studied here) and determinism are enough to force high distortion.
Communication as a measure of complexity is fairly natural, as evidenced by the mechanisms typ-
ically used in practice for large numbers of alternatives. Communication can also be regarded as a
proxy for cognitive effort imposed on the voters, although admittedly, the computation of a mes-
sage µ in a general b-bit bounded mechanism may still require the voter to first determine her full
ranking of all candidates.
The results of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 are lower bounds, raising the question of how small one
can make a mechanism’s distortion when communication is limited. In Section 5, we address this
question, proving the following theorem.
Theorem 1.3 There is a one-round deterministic social choice rule which, given only each voter’s
top k candidates (in order), selects a candidate with distortion at most 79nk .
The deterministic social choice rule of Theorem 1.3 is a generalization of the Copeland rule to
such top-k ballots. Up to constant factors,7 the bounds of Theorems 1.2 and 1.3 match. Closing
the gap between the upper and lower bound is likely difficult, as even for k = n, the best-known
lower bound of 3 does not match the best current upper bound of 2 +
√
5 ≈ 4.23 due to [45];
whether there is a deterministic mechanism with metric distortion 3 is a well-known open question.
Notice also that Theorem 1.3 implies that knowing each voter’s ranking for a constant fraction of
candidates is sufficient to achieve constant distortion, a fact that may not be a priori obvious.
As we discussed earlier, the main focus in this article is on deterministic mechanisms: as dis-
cussed earlier, the Random Dictatorship mechanism has distortion strictly smaller than 3, achieving
small distortion and low communication simultaneously.8 [36] prove a nearly matching lower bound:
they show that every randomized social choice rule in which each voter only communicates her top
k < n/2 candidates must have distortion at least 3 − 2⌊n/k⌋ . However, even for k = 1, this leaves
a gap between the upper bound of essentially 3 for Random Dictatorship and the lower bound of
3− 2n . Recently, [31] shrunk this gap: they proved that the Random Oligarchy mechanism — which
7An application of Corollary 5.3 of [38] gives an upper bound of 12n
k
, which, however, is still far from matching
the lower bound.
8The amount by which it is smaller is of order 1/|V |; here, |V | is the the number of voters, which we consider
“large.”
4
samples three voters and outputs a majority of first-place votes if it exists, and otherwise the choice
of a random voter among the three — achieves expected distortion close to 3− 2n , though there still
remains a small gap between the upper and lower bounds. As an additional result, in Section 6,
we close this remaining gap:
Theorem 1.4 There is a simple randomized social choice rule in which each voter only communi-
cates her first-choice candidate, and which achieves distortion at most 3− 2n .
Nature of Latent Distances
The optimization objective of the mechanism is expressed in terms of latent utilities, or more
specifically, distances. A subtle question is whether voters “know” their utilities for (or distances
to) candidates, or — perhaps more philosophically — whether these utilities/distances are “real.”
In general, one attractive feature of the distortion framework is that it completely obviates the need
to address this question: when a mechanism achieves low distortion, it optimizes robustly over all
possible utility/distance functions consistent with the rankings, and the question of whether voters
could actually quantify the utilities in a meaningful way is irrelevant.
However, when we focus on the design of mechanisms with low communication, the question
should be addressed explicitly, as the answer has a strong impact on the design space for mecha-
nisms. When the mechanism designer has control not only over the aggregation of ballots, but also
over the type of information about voter preferences that is elicited, this opens the door to designing
mechanisms in which agents explicitly communicate numerical estimates of their utilities for some
candidates; in turn, having such information may allow a mechanism to achieve lower distortion
(as we will see in related work below). If agents themselves cannot quantify their utilities, then
not only is communication of a ranking imposed by the class of typically used mechanisms, but it
is inherently the only information about the utilities that agents themselves may have access to.
Which of these two assumptions (or something between the two along a more fine-grained
spectrum) is more realistic likely depends on the envisioned application. For example, if software
agents vote on a preferred alternative in a mostly economically motivated setting, then it is very
reasonable to assume that the agents can compute (good approximations of) their utilities. On
the other hand, when human voters choose between political candidates, assuming an ability to
quantify a metric distance in some abstract space of political positions is much less realistic. Thus,
we believe that for both assumptions, there are important and natural settings in which they are
justified, motivating studies of communication-distortion tradeoffs in both types of scenarios.
1.2 Related Work
Communication complexity [39] generally studies the required communication between multiple
parties wishing to jointly compute an outcome. Several recent works have studied the communica-
tion required specifically for jointly computing particular economic outcomes, or — conversely —
to bound the effects of limited communication on such economic outcomes. These include work on
auctions and allocations [1, 8, 16, 15, 28], persuasion [30], and general mechanism design [42]. While
the high-level concerns are similar across different domains, the specific approaches and techniques
do not appear to carry over.
The impact of communication more specifically on social choice rules has been explored before;
see, for instance, [18] for an overview. However, most of the focus in past work has been on the
number of bits that need to be communicated in order to compute the outcome of a particular
social choice rule, rather than on proving lower bounds arising due to limited communication
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when the social choice rule is not pre-specified. A classic paper in this context is by Conitzer
and Sandholm [24]: they study vote elicitation rules, i.e., protocols by which a mechanism can
interact with voters to determine the winner under a particular voting rule while not eliciting the
full ranking information. This raises algorithmic questions about whether the information obtained
so far uniquely determines a winner as well as incentive issues, among others, and a large amount of
follow-up literature (e.g., [27]) has studied these issues. Relatedly, Conitzer [23] studies how many
comparisons need to be elicited from voters to be able to reconstruct their complete ranking, and
shows that the number is linear (as opposed to quadratic) when preferences are single-peaked (on
the line).
Several very recent papers have explicitly considered the tradeoff between communication and
distortion in social choice, both in deterministic and randomized settings. Perhaps most imme-
diately related is recent work by Fain et al. [31]. Their focus is on mechanisms with extremely
low communication which achieve low expected squared distortion, a measure somewhere between
expected distortion and deterministic distortion. They prove that the Random Referee mechanism,
which asks two randomly chosen voters for their top choices, and asks a third voter to choose be-
tween these two choices, achieves constant expected squared distortion. Notice that this mechanism
elicits different information from different voters. Theorem 1 of [31] shows that this is unavoidable,
in that any mechanism that only obtains top-k lists (for constant k), even from all voters, must
have linear expected squared distortion, implying the same result for the distortion of deterministic
mechanisms. Our Theorem 1.2 generalizes this result for deterministic mechanisms to non-constant
k and sets other than the top k positions.
Another very related piece of work is due to Mandal et al. [40], studying the communication-
distortion tradeoff in a setting where the voters have utilities (instead of costs) for the candidates,
and these utilities are only assumed to be non-negative and normalized, but do not need to satisfy
any other properties (such as being derived from a metric). The other major modeling difference
between our work and [40] is that they assume that agents compute their message µ to the mecha-
nism directly from their utility vector, rather than the ranking. In particular, the mechanism can
be designed to allow voters to express the strength of their preferences, albeit in possibly coarse
form. This allows for a choice of deterministic/randomized algorithms in two places: (1) the voters’
computation of their message, and (2) the mechanism’s aggregation of the messages into a winner.
[40] give upper and lower bounds for deterministic and randomized voting rules in this setting.
The positive/algorithmic results in [40] are obtained primarily by generalizing an approach of
Benade` et al. [11], asking voters to communicate their top few candidates as well as a suitably
rounded version of their utility for those nominated candidates. The bounds are improved in some
parameter regimes by having the mechanism randomly select a subset of candidates and restricting
voters to choose from this subset.
While the results of [40] are clearly directly related to our work, they are not immediately
comparable. Because the utilities are not derived from metrics, the mechanisms need to deal with
much broader classes of inputs, resulting in (generally) weaker upper bounds and stronger lower
bounds. On the other hand, the assumption that voters can explicitly quantify their utilities — and
hence have them elicited by a mechanism — gives a mechanism more power than in our setting.
Another related recent piece of work is on approval-based voting, due to Pierczyn´ski and
Skowron [46]. While much of this work focuses on a different notion of distortion — analyzing
the fraction of voters who approve of the winning candidate in the sense of being “close enough” —
[46] also analyzes the (traditional) distortion of approval-based voting. Under the type of mecha-
nism that they consider, rather than approving a given number of voters (as in k-approval), voters
approve all candidates within a given distance of themselves, i.e., within a ball of given radius
around themselves. This approval radius can be voter-specific or uniform across voters. In this
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context, the main result of [46] is to show specific constant distortion whenever a uniform approval
radius ensures that a constant fraction of voters, bounded away from 0 and 1, have the optimum
candidate within their approval radius.9 It is of course not clear how a mechanism (or the voters)
could determine such a radius. Also note that this type of approval-based mechanism does require
voters to quantify their distances, rather than just interact with their individual ordinal rankings.
Note that Theorem 1.3 can be considered as somewhat related to this result. It shows that
whenever voters communicate their top k candidates, where k is a constant fraction of the number
of candidates, there is a mechanism with constant distortion. However, in contrast to the result of
[46], not just the identity, but also the ranking of these top k candidates must be communicated; on
the other hand, the theorem makes no assumptions about whether the optimum candidate appears
in any of these top-k rankings.
Low communication complexity of voter preferences is also the focus of a recent preprint by
Bentert and Skowron [12]. They study the more “traditional” goal of implementing given voting
rules with low communication [18], but are interested in approximate implementation of these rules.
To make approximation meaningful, they focus on score-based rules, which naturally assign each
candidate a score (such as Borda Count, Plurality, or MiniMax). Then, the quality of approximation
is the ratio between the score of the winner under full information vs. the score of the winner under
limited communication. They focus on mechanisms in which each voter is asked to rank a small
subset of candidates; this subset is either the voter’s top k candidates (a deterministic mechanism)
or a random subset of k candidates (a randomized mechanism).
Given that the goal in [12] is the approximate implementation of specific scoring-based voting
rules rather than achieving low distortion, the results are not directly comparable. However, the
techniques in Section 3.2 of [12] readily yield a randomized mechanism with distortion 5 + O(ǫ)
and very low communication complexity per voter when the number of voters is sufficiently large.
By asking each voter to compare a uniformly random pair of candidates (see also [37]), and using
the majority of returned votes, with high probability (by Chernoff and Union Bounds), one obtains
a tournament graph in which each directed edge (x, y) corresponds to at least a 12 − ǫ fraction of
voters preferring x over y. Then, a straightforward modification of the analysis of the distortion
of uncovered set rules in [3] (or a simple application of Corollary 5.3 in [38]) gives a distortion of
5+O(ǫ). This rule only requires each voter to compute 1 bit in total. However, different voters are
asked to answer different questions, which is often considered undesirable. Furthermore, the total
communication complexity is n bits, whereas the Random Dictator mechanism only needs to elicit
log2 n bits from one voter.
The recent work of Bentert and Skowron is somewhat related to earlier work of Filmus and
Oren [33]: they are also interested in the question of when top-k ballots from voters are sufficient
to obtain the correct candidate. However, [33] study this question under probabilistic models for
the ballots, significantly changing the nature of the results.
The metric-based distortion view of social choice has proved to be a very fruitful analysis
framework. In fact, it has been extended beyond social choice to other optimization problems in
which it is natural to assume that a mechanism only receives ordinal information; see, e.g., [6, 2].
Several modeling assumptions have been proposed that yield lower distortion than the worst-case
bounds of [3]. One such assumption is termed decisiveness [5, 36]: it posits that for every voter,
there is a sufficiently clear first choice among candidates. When the metric space is sufficiently
decisive, significantly stronger upper bounds on the distortion can be proved. An alternative
approach was proposed in [21, 22]. The authors assumed that the candidates were “representative,”
in that they themselves were drawn i.i.d. uniformly from the set of voters. Under this assumption,
9In particular, when that fraction is between 1
4
and 1
2
, the distortion is at most 3.
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the authors obtained improved expected distortion bounds for the case of two candidates [21], and
constant expected distortion for Borda count and several other position-based scoring rules [22].
As mentioned above, the gap between the upper bound of 5 (achieved, e.g., by the Copeland
rule) and the lower bound of 3 has posed an interesting open question for several years now. One
initial conjecture of [4] was that the Ranked Pairs mechanism might achieve a distortion of 3. This
conjecture was disproved by [35], who showed a lower bound of 5 on the distortion of Ranked Pairs.
Very recently, Munagala and Wang [45] have presented a (deterministic) social choice rule with
distortion at most 2 +
√
5 ≈ 4.23, which is the first piece of progress towards closing the gap.
In our and much of the preceding work on metric voting, the focus is on distortion, while
ignoring incentive compatibility. (Recall the strong impossibility result of [34, 49].) The connection
between strategy proofness and distortion in this type of setting was studied in [32].
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Voters, Candidates, and Social Choice Rules
There are n candidates, which we always denote by lowercase letters at the end of the alphabet. Sets
of candidates are denoted by uppercase letters, and X is the set of all candidates. The preference
order (or ranking) of voter v over the candidates is a bijection πv : {1, . . . , n} → X, mapping
positions i to the candidate x = πv(i) which voter v ranks in position i. We say that v (strictly)
prefers x to y iff π−1v (x) < π
−1
v (y). When only the ranking, but not the identity, of a voter is
relevant, we will omit the subscript v for legibility. The set of all voters10 is denoted by V . We
write Sn for the set of all possible rankings π : {1, . . . , n} → X, and P = (πv(i))v∈V,i∈{1,...,n} for the
rankings of all voters, which we call the vote profile.
In the traditional full-information view, a social choice rule (we use the terms mechanism or
voting mechanism interchangeably) f : SVn → X is given the rankings of all voters, i.e., P, and
produces as output one winning candidate w = f(P). For most of this article, we are interested
only in deterministic social choice rules f .
2.2 Communication-bounded mechanisms
Our main contribution is to consider communication-bounded social choice rules. As in the standard
model described above, we still only consider deterministic single-round mechanisms, i.e., each voter
can only send a single message to the mechanism. However, this message is now also restricted to
be at most b bits long.
This induces M = 2b sets Π1,Π2, . . . ,ΠM of rankings; when the mechanism receives a message
µ from voter v, all it learns is that πv ∈ Πµ. As discussed in the introduction, we assume that
the Πµ form a disjoint partition of Sn, i.e., they are pairwise disjoint and cover all rankings:⋃M
µ=1ΠM = Sn. The fact that M is a power of 2 is not relevant anywhere in our proofs, so we also
consider mechanisms with arbitrary numbers M of sets.
Definition 2.1 (M-communication bounded social choice rule) An M -communication bounded
social choice rule consists of pairwise disjoint sets Π1,Π2, . . . ,ΠM ⊆ Sn with
⋃M
µ=1ΠM = Sn, and
a deterministic mapping f : {1, . . . ,M}V → X.
10We will not need to reference the number of voters explicitly. In general, we treat the number of voters as “much
larger” than the number of candidates, and are only interested in bounds in terms of the number of candidates.
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Communication-bounded social choice rules that are used in practice, such as Plurality, Veto,
k-approval, and combinations thereof, are of a specific form: there is a set K of k positions, and
voters can communicate the set of candidates they have in positions inK, possibly with an ordering,
but cannot communicate any additional information about their ranking of candidates in positions
outside K. For such mechanisms, we will be able to prove stronger lower bounds on the distortion,
and with a significantly simpler proof. We define them formally as follows:
Definition 2.2 A k-entry social choice rule is anM -communication bounded social choice rule with
the following additional restriction on the sets Π1,Π2, . . . ,ΠM : there exists a set K ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of
at most k positions such that if π, π′ agree for all positions in K, i.e., π(i) = π′(i) for all i ∈ K,
then π ∈ Πµ if and only if π′ ∈ Πµ.
2.3 Metric Space and Distortion
The key modeling contribution of the metric-based distortion [4] objective is to assume that all
voters and candidates are embedded in a pseudo-metric space d. d(v, x) denotes the distance
between voter v and candidate x. Being a pseudo-metric, it satisfies non-negativity and the triangle
inequality d(v, x) ≤ d(v, y) + d(v′, y) + d(v′, x) for all voters v, v′ and candidates x, y. Given our
choice of defining the metric only for pairs consisting of a voter and a candidate, symmetry is not
directly relevant. One can naturally extend the pseudo-metric to pairs of candidates or pairs of
voters, but those distances will never appear in our mechanisms or proofs. For our upper bounds,
we explicitly allow the distance between candidates and voters (and thus also between pairs of
candidates or pairs of voters) to be 0; however, for improved flow, we will still refer to d as a
metric. In our lower-bound constructions, all distances will be strictly positive; that is, we do not
exploit the increased generality for negative results.
We say that a vote profile P is consistent with the metric d, and write d ∼ P, if πv(x) < πv(y)
whenever d(v, x) < d(v, y). That is, P is consistent with d iff all voters rank candidates by non-
decreasing distance from themselves. Notice that in case of ties among distances, i.e., d(v, x) =
d(v, y), several vote profiles are consistent with d. None of our results depend on any tie breaking
assumptions.
The cost of candidate x is C(x) =
∑
v d(v, x), i.e., the sum of distances of x to all voters.
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An optimum candidate is any candidate x∗d ∈ argminx∈X C(x); in our analysis, it will not matter
which candidate is considered “the” optimum candidate in case of ties.
The social choice rule is handicapped by not knowing the metric d, instead only observing the
consistent vote profile P (or some limited information about it, when communication is restricted).
Due to this handicap, and possibly other suboptimal choices, it will typically choose candidates
with higher cost than C(x∗). The distortion of f is the worst-case ratio between the cost of the
candidate chosen by f , and the optimal candidate x∗d (determined with knowledge of the actual
distances d). Formally,
ρ(f) = max
P
sup
d:d∼P
C(f(P))
C(x∗d)
.
We can think of the distortion in terms of a game between the social choice rule and an adversary.
First, the adversary chooses the vote profile P. Then, the social choice rule, knowing only P (or
part of that information, in case of communication restrictions), chooses a winning candidate w =
f(P). Then, the adversary chooses a metric d consistent with P that maximizes the ratio between
the cost of the candidate chosen by f and the optimum candidate for d.
11[4] also consider the median distance as an optimization objective; here, we only focus on the sum/average
objective.
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The goal now is to define a social choice rule f—under suitable constraints — that achieves small
distortion ρ(f), and to prove lower bounds on all social choice rules under the given constraints.
3 A Lower Bound for k-Entry Social Choice Rules
In this section, we establish the lower bound of Theorem 1.2, restated here formally.
Theorem 3.1 Every one-round deterministic k-entry social choice rule has distortion at least
2n−k
k .
Proof. Let K = {κ1 < κ2 < · · · < κk}. Because every deterministic social choice rule has
distortion at least 3 [4], we only need to consider the case where 2n−k > 3k, i.e., k < n/2. We will
prove the theorem by induction on n, with the base case n = 2 holding because the only such case
with k < n/2 is k = 0, where the mechanism receives no information about any voter’s preferences,
and hence has unbounded distortion.
First, we consider the case when n ∈ K. We designate one candidate xˆ who is “infinitely” far
from all other candidates and voters, and thus ranked last by all voters. The mechanism clearly
cannot choose xˆ as a winner. This reduces the problem to one of n − 1 candidates, and a set
K ′ = K \ {n} of k − 1 positions at which voters specify their ranking. By induction hypothesis,
applied to this instance, the distortion is lower-bounded by 2(n−1)−(k−1)k−1 =
2n−k−1
k−1 >
2n−k
k ; the
inequality holds because k < n.
For the remainder of the proof, we can assume that n /∈ K, i.e., voters do not specify their least
favorite candidate. In this case, we will not need to use the induction hypothesis for n − 1. For
each subset S ⊆ X, |S| = k of k candidates, and each ordering σ : {1, . . . , k} → S, we say that
a voter v has type (S, σ) if she puts the candidates from S in the positions K, in the order given
by σ. That is, v has type (S, σ) iff πv(κi) = σ(i) for i = 1, . . . , k. There are t =
(
n
k
) · k! types of
voters. We define a vote profile which has exactly a 1/t fraction of voters of type (S, σ), for each
type. Throughout, we will talk about fractions, rather than numbers, of voters, so that the total
adds up to 1.
Each subset of candidates and each order among those candidates is equally frequent, and in
aggregate, the vote profile expresses no preference by the voters for any candidate over any other.
Let w be the candidate chosen by the social choice rule for this input. w is well-defined as a function
of all voters’ types, because (1) for each voter v, the message sent by v is uniquely determined by
her ranking of candidates in positions in K, and (2) the mechanism’s output is a deterministic
function of only the messages sent by the voters.
We now define a metric space. Let ǫ be a very small constant (we will let ǫ→ 0), and 0 < ǫ1 <
ǫ2 < · · · < ǫn < ǫ. Consider a voter v of type (S, σ). We distinguish two cases:
1. In the first case, w /∈ S. Let πv be any ordering that puts the candidates in S in positions K
in the order σ, and which additionally has πv(n) = w, i.e., candidate w is in the last position
in v’s ranking. Apart from this, πv is arbitrary. By construction, a voter v with ranking
πv has type (S, σ). We now set the distance between v and the candidate w to 1, and the
distance from v to every candidate πv(i) (for i < n) to ǫ+ ǫi. These distances are consistent
with the ranking πv.
2. In the second case, w ∈ S. Again, let πv be any permutation that puts the candidates in S
in positions K in the order σ (ensuring that πv is consistent with v having type (S, σ)). This
time, the position of w in π is prescribed by S, σ, and we let the remaining positions of πv
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be arbitrary. Voter v has distance exactly 12 + ǫ+ ǫi from each candidate πv(i), including the
case when πv(w) = i. Again, v ranks the candidates in the order given by πv.
We now verify that these distances satisfy the triangle inequality. Consider voters v, v′ and candi-
dates x, y. We will show that d(v, y) ≤ d(v, x) + d(v′, x) + d(v′, y), by distinguishing two cases for
y:
1. In the first case, y = w. Then, 12 + ǫ ≤ d(v, y) ≤ 1. Either the distance d(v′, y) = 1, in which
case the triangle inequality holds obviously, or d(v′, y) ≥ 12 + ǫ, in which case our definition
ensures that d(v′, x) ≥ 12 + ǫ as well. In either case, the triangle inequality holds.
2. In the second case, y 6= w, so either ǫ < d(v, y) < 2ǫ or 12 + ǫ < d(v, y) < 12 +2ǫ, depending on
the case of the definition. Because all distances are lower-bounded by ǫ, the triangle inequality
clearly holds if d(v, y) < 2ǫ. In the other case 12 + ǫ < d(v, y), we have that
1
2 + ǫ < d(v, x),
which together with ǫ < d(v′, x) again ensures that the triangle inequality holds.
Recall that w is selected by the social choice rule under the given rankings. Each voter of type
(S, σ) with w /∈ S has cost 1 for candidate w, and cost at most 2ǫ for any candidate x 6= w. Each
voter of type (S, σ) with w ∈ S has cost at least 12 for candidate w, and cost at most 12 + 2ǫ for
each candidate x 6= w.
Of the t types (S, σ), exactly
(n−1
k−1
) · k! have w ∈ S. Thus, the cost of candidate w is at least
1
t ·(12 ·
(n−1
k−1
)·k!+1·(t−(n−1k−1)·k!)), while the cost of any other candidate is at most 1t ·(2ǫ+ 12 ·(n−1k−1)·k!).
Letting ǫ→ 0, the distortion approaches
1 +
2( n!(n−k)! − k·(n−1)!(n−k)! )
k·(n−1)!
(n−k)!
= 1 +
2(n− k)
k
=
2n− k
k
.
4 The General Lower Bound
In this section, we prove the more general lower bound of Theorem 1.1. The bound applies to all
M -communication bounded social choice rules, but is slightly weaker than that of Theorem 3.1. To
gain some insight into general communication-bounded social choice rules, we begin with an easy
proposition, independently obtained as Lemma 4.1 in [40]. We include a proof here for completeness,
and because it illustrates some of the type of reasoning required for the proof of Theorem 1.1.
Proposition 4.1 Assume that there exists a set Πµ containing two rankings π, π
′ with π(1) 6=
π′(1), i.e., there is a µ which does not uniquely specify the voter’s top-ranked candidate. Then, the
corresponding social choice rule has unbounded distortion.
Proof. Let x = π(1), y = π′(1). Consider a vote profile in which all voters communicate the
message µ to the mechanism, i.e., state that their ranking is in Πµ. If the mechanism chooses x as
the winner, then the metric will be such that all voters have distance 0 from y, and distance 1 from
all other candidates12, including x. Then, the cost of y is 0, while the cost of x is 1, giving infinite
cost ratio, i.e., distortion. Similarly, if the mechanism does not choose x as the winner, then all
voters will be at distance 0 from x and at distance 1 from all other candidates, including y. Again,
the cost ratio between the optimum candidate x and the winner will be infinite.
12At the cost of small ǫi, which we could then let go to 0, we could avoid ties here; in the limit, we would obtain
exactly the same result. See the proof of Theorem 3.1 for spelled-out details.
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Theorem 4.2 Let f be any one-round M -communication bounded social choice rule on n candi-
dates. Then, f must have distortion at least 2n−4lnM − 1.
Proof. The high-level idea of the proof is to use induction on the number of candidates, to show
that when communication is “sufficiently bounded,” any social choice rule must have high distortion.
After completing the proof by induction, we would like to apply the result to n candidates, and
“sufficiently bounded” must then include M -communication bounded. Therefore, the relationship
between the number of candidates in the induction proof and the bound on communication depends
on n,M , and to avoid notational ambiguity, we will use different variable names for the induction.
Specifically, we use ν for the number of candidates within the induction proof, and Mν for the
upper bound on communication.
Let γ = 1−M−1/(n−2). We will prove by induction on ν that everyMν-communication bounded
social choice rule on ν candidates with Mν ≤ 1(1−γ)ν−2 has distortion at least 2γ − 1.
The base case ν = 2 is easy: the communication bound is M2 ≤ 1(1−γ)2−2 = 1, so the voters
cannot communicate any preference. By Proposition 4.1, the social choice rule has unbounded
distortion. For the induction step, we distinguish two cases:
1. In the first case, we assume that for each candidate x, at least a 1− γ fraction of all sets Πµ
contain a ranking πµ ∈ Πµ that ranks x last, i.e., πµ(ν) = x. Then, we consider a vote profile
with Mν voters in which for each µ = 1, . . . ,Mν , exactly one voter submits µ.
Let w be the candidate chosen by f . Consider the following metric space: For every voter v
who submitted µ such that there is a ranking πµ ∈ Πµ ranking w last, we define the distance
between v and w to be 1, and the distance from all other candidates13 to be 0. For all
other voters, the distance to all candidates is 12 . Said differently, all candidates x 6= w are
at distance 0 from each other, and at distance 1 from w. All voters who could possibly rank
w last are in the same location as the candidates different from w, while all other voters are
halfway between w and the other candidates.
Then, the cost of w is at least γ · 12 +(1−γ) ·1 = 1− γ2 , while the cost of each other candidate
is at most γ · 12 + (1 − γ) · 0 = γ2 . Thus, the distortion of the mechanism is at least 2γ − 1,
completing the proof directly.
2. Otherwise, let x be a candidate such that at most a 1 − γ fraction of all sets Πµ contain a
ranking πµ ∈ Πµ that ranks x last. Define Mν−1 to be the number of such sets, and assume
w.l.o.g. (by renumbering) that Π1,Π2, . . . ,ΠMν−1 are all the sets which contain at least one
ranking with x in the last position. By the assumption in this part of the proof, we have
that Mν−1 ≤ ⌊(1− γ) ·Mν⌋. We will only construct instances in which all voters rank x last;
thus, no voter communicates any message µ > Mν−1.
No mechanism with finite distortion can select x as a winner, by the same argument as in
the preceding case. (That is, the metric puts x at distance 1 from all voters, and all other
candidates at distance 0 from all voters.) As a result, we obtain an instance with ν − 1
candidates, only (ν − 1)! remaining possible rankings, and — crucially — only Mν−1 ≤
(1− γ) ·Mν remaining sets of rankings. We can therefore apply the induction hypothesis for
ν − 1, and conclude that the mechanism’s distortion is at least 2γ − 1.
To show that we can apply the inductive claim with ν = n in the end, observe that Mn =M =
M (n−2)/(n−2) = 1(1−γ)n−2 .
13Again, ties could be broken by using small ǫi → 0 without affecting the final result.
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It remains to show that 2γ −1 ≥ 2n−4lnM −1. To do so, we rewrite γ by using the Taylor expansion
of t1/(n−2) around t = 1, then apply straightforward bounds:
γ = 1−M−1/(n−2)
=
1
n− 2
∞∑
k=1
1
k
· (1− 1/M)k ·
k−1∏
j=1
(
1− 1
j · (n− 2)
)
≤ 1
n− 2
∞∑
k=1
1
k
· (1− 1/M)k
=
1
n− 2 · lnM.
Substituting this bound for γ into the distortion completes the proof.
To compare the bound of Theorem 4.2 with that of Theorem 3.1, observe that when voters get
to specify the candidates in each of k (given) positions in a ranking, this generates a partition of
Sn into M =
(n
k
) · k! = n!(n−k)! sets: one for each subset and order within that subset. These sets of
rankings do in fact form a disjoint cover. For the “interesting” range k ≤ n/2, we can simply bound
(n/2)k ≤M ≤ nk, so we get that lnM ≈ k lnn. This shows that the lower bound of Theorem 4.2 is
weaker than that of Theorem 3.1 by a factor of Θ(log n). Closing this gap is an interesting direction
for future work, briefly discussed in Section 7.
5 A Near-Matching Upper Bound
While the results of Theorems 3.1 and 4.2 are negative, there are parameter ranges, such as k =
o(n), k = ω(1), in which they leave room for non-trivial positive results, in particular, sublinear
distortion. In this section, we investigate how well one-round mechanisms can do with limited
communication.
Our main result is a k-entry social choice rule which — up to constants — matches the lower
bound of Theorem 3.1. This shows that the lower bound of Theorem 3.1 is essentially tight. Not
surprisingly, the mechanism is a variation on uncovered set mechanisms, which are the only type
of mechanism known to achieve constant distortion even with access to the full vote profile.
In our mechanism, each voter communicates her top k choices. We say that voter v prefers x
over y if either: (1) Both x and y are among her top choices, and she ranks x higher than y, or (2)
x is among her top choices, and y is not. Obviously, the mechanism does not know which of two
candidates she prefers if neither candidate is among her top k candidates.
As in uncovered set mechanisms like Copeland, we construct a comparison graph G among the
n candidates. Define α = k3n . For each ordered pair x, y, the graph G contains a directed edge
(x, y) if and only if at least an α fraction of all voters prefer x over y. Notice that because α ≤ 12 ,
it is possible that G contains both (x, y) and (y, x). Similarly, it is possible that for a pair {x, y},
G contains neither (x, y) nor (y, x); for instance, this will happen if no voter ranks either x or y
among her top k candidates.
Let S2 be the set of candidates x such that at least a 2α fraction of voters rank x among their
top k candidates. (We will show in the proof of Lemma 5.2 that S2 is not empty.) The winner w
returned byM is a candidate in the induced graph G[S2] with largest outdegree; notice that edges
leaving S2 are not counted.
Theorem 5.1 M has distortion at most 79nk .
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We begin with a lemma showing the key structural property of the winning candidate w.
Lemma 5.2 In G, for every candidate x, there is a directed path of length at most 3 from w to x.
Proof. Similar to the definition of S2, let S3 be the set of candidates x such that at least a
3α fraction of the voters ranks x somewhere among their top k candidates. By the Pigeon Hole
Principle, because each voter ranks a kn fraction of candidates in her top k, and α =
k
3n , at least
one candidate occurs in a 3α fraction of top-k lists. In particular, S3 (and thus S2) is non-empty.
Each candidate x ∈ S3 has a directed edge to each candidate y /∈ S2.14 This is because x appears
in at least a 3α fraction of top-k lists, while y appears in at most a 2α fraction. In particular, at
least an α fraction of voters rank x, but not y, in their top-k lists, and thus prefer x to y.
Now consider the induced graph G[S2]. For each pair x, y ∈ S2, at least one of the edges (x, y)
or (y, x) is in G[S2]. This is because of the (at least) 2α fraction of voters with x in their lists, at
least an α fraction rank y higher in their lists, or at least an α fraction rank y lower (or not in their
lists). Hence, G[S2] is a supergraph of a tournament graph.
Because w has maximum degree in G[S2], it also has maximum degree in at least one tourna-
ment subgraph of G[S2]. It is well known (see, e.g., [44, 4]) that the maximum-degree node in a
tournament graph is in the uncovered set, i.e., it has a directed path of length at most 2 to every
other node. This of course still holds in the supergraphs G[S2] and G. Thus, w has a directed path
of length 2 in G to every candidate x ∈ S2.
Let y ∈ S3 be arbitrary. By the preceding two paragraphs, y has a directed edge to each x /∈ S2,
and w has a directed path of length at most 2 to y. In summary, w has a directed path of length
at most 3 to each candidate x.
Next, we show a lemma upper-bounding the cost ratio of two candidates x, y when x has a
directed path of length at most 3 to y.
Lemma 5.3 Let w, z be two candidates such that there is a directed path of length at most ℓ edges
from w to z in G. Then, C(w) ≤ (1 + 3ℓ−1α ) · C(z).
Remark 5.4 Lemma 5.3 can be considered a (somewhat weaker) generalization of a result proved
in the proof of Theorem 7 in [4] (see also the discussion in the subsequent remark in [4]). By
Lemma 6 of [4], if an α fraction of voters prefer x over y, then C(x) ≤ 1 + 2(1−α)α · C(y). In
particular, for α = 12 , this implies an upper bound of 3 on the cost ratio. If x has a directed path
of length ℓ to y, then this bound implies15 that C(x) ≤ 3ℓ ·C(y). However, since we are interested
in a regime where α = o(1), the exponential dependence on ℓ (recall that we have ℓ = 3) would
result in bounds that do not match our lower bounds asymptotically. The point of Lemma 5.3 is
to improve upon this exponential dependence.
The exponential dependence on ℓ is an artifact of our relatively simple proof. Applying Corol-
lary 5.3 from [38] instead would yield an improved bound of ℓα+1 or
ℓ+1
α −1, depending on whether
ℓ is even or odd.
Proof. Let (w, y1, y2, . . . , yℓ−1, yℓ := z) be a directed path of ℓ edges from w to z. We distinguish
two cases, based on the relative lengths of the distances d(w, yi) and d(yi, z), compared to d(w, z).
14The opposite edge may be in G as well; this is irrelevant.
15Theorem 7 of [4] uses a more intricate proof to improve the upper bound for length-2 paths from this immediate
9 to 5.
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1. If there exists a candidate yi (with i < ℓ) such that d(yi, yi+1) ≥ 2·3ℓ−i−13ℓ−1 · d(w, z), then let i
be maximal with this property.
All the voters who prefer yi over yi+1, which comprise at least an α fraction of all voters, are
at distance at least d(yi,yi+1)2 ≥ 3
ℓ−i−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z) from yi+1.
By maximality of i, all candidates yj with j > i have d(yj, yj+1) <
2·3ℓ−j−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z). Using
the triangle inequality and summing this inequality for all j > i gives us that d(yi+1, z) <
2·3ℓ−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z) ·∑ℓ−1j=i+1 3−j = 2·3ℓ−13ℓ−1 · d(w, z) · 3−i)−3−(ℓ−1)2 = 3ℓ−1−i−13ℓ−1 · d(w, z).
Again by triangle inequality, the voters who prefer yi over yi+1 are at distance at least
d(yi, z) ≥ d(yi,yi+1)2 − d(yi+1, z) ≥ 3
ℓ−i−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z) − 3ℓ−1−i−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z) = 1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z) from z.
2. In the other case, all candidates yi with i < ℓ have d(yi, yi+1) <
2·3ℓ−i−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z). Again,
using the triangle inequality and summing this inequality for all i, we can bound d(y1, z) <
2·3ℓ−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z) ·∑ℓ−1j=1 3−j = 2·3ℓ−13ℓ−1 · d(w, z) · 1−3−(ℓ−1)2 = 3ℓ−1−13ℓ−1 · d(w, z).
Therefore, by triangle inequality, d(w, y1) ≥ d(w, z) − d(y1, z) > 3ℓ−3ℓ−13ℓ−1 · d(w, z) = 2·3
ℓ−1
3ℓ−1
·
d(w, z).
At least an α fraction of voters prefer w over y1, and their distance to y1 is at least
1
2d(w, y1) >
3ℓ−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z). Because the distance from y1 to z is at most 3ℓ−1−13ℓ−1 · d(w, z), by the triangle
inequality, the distance of these voters from z is at least 3
ℓ−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z) − 3ℓ−1−1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z) =
1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z).
In both cases, we have thus shown that at least an α fraction of voters are at distance at least
1
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z) from z. Thus, the cost of z is at least α
3ℓ−1
· d(w, z). By the triangle inequality,
C(w) ≤ C(z) + d(w, z) ≤ (1 + 3
ℓ − 1
α
) · C(z).
This completes the proof of the lemma.
Proof of Theorem 5.1. By Lemma 5.2, w has a path of length at most 3 in G to every candidate
x; in particular, to the optimum candidate x = x∗. Thus, by Lemma 5.3 with ℓ = 3, C(w) ≤
(1 + 26α ) · C(x∗). Substituting α = k3n and bounding 1 ≤ nk now completes the proof.
6 A Tight Upper Bound for Randomized Algorithms
We have seen that limited communication is a serious handicap for deterministic social choice
rules, in that all communication-bounded deterministic social choice rules must have essentially
linear distortion. It is well known [5, 36] that this lower bound disappears for randomized social
choice rules: for example, the Random Dictatorship mechanism, which elects the first choice of
a uniformly random voter, has distortion slightly smaller than 3, even though each voter only
communicates her first choice.
When each voter can only communicate her first choice, [36] proved a lower bound of 3− 2n on
the distortion of every randomized mechanism. Fain et al. [31] showed that the Random Oligarchy
mechanism has a an upper bound on the distortion almost matching the 3− 2n bound. Here, we give
a simple randomized mechanism which achieves an expected distortion of exactly 3 − 2n , thereby
closing the remaining gap. The mechanism M is as follows:
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• With probability 1n−1 , select a candidate using the Proportional to Squares mechanism. That
is, for each candidate x, let νx be the fraction of voters who rank x first. Select candidate x
with probability ν
2
x∑
y ν
2
y
.
• With the remaining probability n−2n−1 , select a candidate using the Random Dictatorship mech-
anism. That is, choose a voter uniformly at random, and return her first choice. Notice that
this mechanism selects candidate x with probability exactly νx.
We prove the following theorem:
Theorem 6.1 The expected distortion of M is at most 3− 2n .
The proof is straightforward: it consists of a bit of arithmetic and using Lemma 3 of [36],
restated here in our notation.
Lemma 6.2 (Lemma 3 of [36]) Let ν = (νx)x be the vector of the fractions of voters ranking
candidate x first, for all x. Suppose that for every such first-place vote vector ν and every candidate
x, the probability of electing x under M is at most qx(ν). Then, the distortion of M is at most
1 + 2maxν,x(qx(ν) · 1−νxνx ).
The main technical lemma, proved momentarily, is the following:
Lemma 6.3 For all t ∈ [0, 1], we have that (1− 1n−1) · (1− t) + t(1−t)(n−1)t2+(1−t)2 ≤ 1− 1n .
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Let candidate x be the first choice of a fraction ν := νx of voters. The
probability that x is chosen under M is
(1− 1
n− 1) · ν +
1
n− 1 ·
ν2∑
y ν
2
y
≤ (1− 1
n− 1) · ν +
1
n− 1 ·
ν2
ν2 + (n− 1)
(
1−ν
n−1
)2
= (1− 1
n− 1) · ν +
ν2
(n− 1) · ν2 + (1− ν)2 .
Multiplying with the term 1−νν , we now have
(1− 1
n− 1) · (1− ν) +
ν · (1− ν)
(n− 1) · ν2 + (1− ν)2 .
By Lemma 6.3, this quantity is bounded by 1− 1n . Since this bound holds for all x and all νx, we
can substitute it into Lemma 6.2, and obtain a bound of 3− 2n on the distortion, as claimed.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. We want to upper-bound f(t) = (1− 1n−1) · (1− t)+ t(1−t)(n−1)t2+(1−t)2 . First,
we have that f(0) = 1− 1n−1 , and f(1) = 0, so the inequality holds at the extreme points.
We lower-bound the denominator g(t) = (n − 1)t2 + (1 − t)2 of the second term. By setting
the derivative g′(t) = 0, we get that the only local extremum is a minimum at t = 1n , where
g(1/n) = n−1n , whereas g(0) = 1 and g(1) = n−1. Thus, g(t) ≥ n−1n . Substituting the lower bound
on g(t), we can bound
f(t) ≤ (1− 1
n− 1) · (1− t) +
n · t · (1− t)
n− 1 .
A derivative test shows that this expression has a local maximum at t = 1n , where its value is 1− 1n .
Thus, we have shown that f(t) ≤ 1− 1n for all t ∈ [0, 1].
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7 Conclusions
As we already discussed in the introduction and Section 4, there is a gap of Θ(log n) in the lower
bound on distortion we achieve for k-entry social choice rules and more general M -communication
bounded social choice rules. It does not appear that our techniques from Section 4 can be directly
generalized to produce bounds matching the ones of Theorem 3.1. Thus, if the stronger bound
holds more generally, a proof will likely require a deeper understanding of the combinatorial struc-
ture of partitions of Sn. An intriguing alternative is that there may be a mechanism in which
voters communicate only Θ(1) bits of information per candidate, but which nonetheless achieves
constant distortion. An obstacle to designing such mechanisms is that it is very unclear how a
mechanism would make use of information in which it cannot distinguish between several very
different rankings.
Throughout this article, we assumed that all voters use the same “encoding” in communicating
with the mechanism. For both k-entry social choice rules andM -communication bounded rules, one
could consider relaxing this uniformity, although voting mechanisms which treat voters differently a
priori are typically not widely accepted. For k-entry social choice rules, our lower-bound proof can
be directly adapted to give the same lower bound so long as no voter (or almost no voter) gets to
specify which candidate she ranks last. However, the proof does not carry over directly when some,
but not all, voters can specify their bottom-ranked candidate, since our technique of “sacrificing”
a candidate may come at a higher cost to the adversary. For M -communication bounded rules, it
is much less clear how to deal with arbitrarily differing encodings.
A further generalization would be to let voters choose which encoding to use, or which subset of
positions to fill in. Mechanisms allowing such a choice by the voters would have to be considered as
“non-deterministic,” because there is not a unique message any more for each ranking. This raises
the issue of how a voter would determine which of many possible messages to send. In particular,
the specific choice of message may encode additional (e.g., cardinal) information about the voter’s
ranking. It would require some subtlety to define a model to rule out the revelation of a lot of
cardinal information, while still allowing voters non-trivial choices.
Here, we only considered single-round mechanisms. It is well-known that in many settings,
including in the implementation of social choice rules [18, 50], multiple rounds of communication
can lead to significantly (including exponentially) lower overall communication. Indeed, [36, 31]
studied randomized multi-round voting mechanisms with the explicit goal of reducing the required
communication, while achieving low distortion. In the case of randomized mechanisms, receiving
log2 n bits of information from each voter is enough to achieve distortion 3 − 2n (as we showed in
Section 6 — it was known previously how to achieve distortion 3), so the room for improving the
required communication with multiple rounds is limited. However, for deterministic mechanisms,
there is potential for significant improvement, and a natural question is whether one might even
achieve constant distortion with only O(log n) (or O(polylog(n))) communication from each voter.
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